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We study 120 rights offerings by closed-end funds over 1988-1998.  On average, rights 
offerings are announced when funds trade at a premium.  This premium turns into a discount 
over the course of the offering.  The premium decline is more severe when the increases in 
investment advisor’s compensation are larger and when the fund uses affiliated broker-dealers 
to solicit subscriptions to the offer.  A clinical analysis shows that rights offerings allow 
investment advisors to sidestep fee rebates and increase pecuniary benefits to affiliated entities.  




I. Introduction  
It is widely known that closed-end funds often trade at a discount to their Net Asset Value (NAV).  
Numerous studies argue that at least part of this discount might be attributable to agency costs in fund 
management.  Boudreaux (1973) and Roenfeld and Tutle (1973) provide early evidence on this 
subject.  More recently, Brauer (1984, 1988) and Brickley and Schallheim (1985) argue that open 
ending a fund can eliminate the discount, but that managerial entrenchment reduces the likelihood of 
open ending.  Barclay, Holderness, and Pontiff (1993) confirm the importance of managerial 
entrenchment by showing that friendly blockholders in closed-end funds derive a multitude of pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary benefits from their ownership stakes, and that these benefits contribute to discounts.  
They report that the average discount for funds with blockholders is 14% versus 4% for funds without 
blockholders.  Coles, Suay, and Woodbury (2000) demonstrate how compensation contracts affect 
fund value.  They report that discounts are approximately one percentage point smaller when 
investment advisors’ compensation contracts are more sensitive to fund performance.1 
In this paper, we examine agency conflicts in closed-end funds in a setting that allows the 
investment advisors to increase pecuniary benefits from a specific event.  In particular, we explore the 
benefits derived by investment advisors from 120 rights offerings by 73 different closed-end funds over 
1988-1998.   The advantage of focusing on a specific endogenous event is that it allows us to explore 
the relation between the extraction of rents and changes in premiums, conditional on the event.  This 
                                                 
1 Not surprisingly, this concern over managerial discretion in closed-end funds has also prompted regulatory 
interest.  Recently, Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, in opening remarks at a 
roundtable on boards of directors in the money management industry, expressed concerns regarding the 
independence of directors in closed-end funds (SEC, 1999). 
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approach differentiates our study from others that show a correlation between agency costs and 
premium levels (e.g., Barclay, Holderness, and Pontiff (1993) and Coles, Suay, and Woodbury 
(2000)).   
We find that rights offerings are announced when funds trade at an average premium of 
approximately 2%.  This premium turns into a discount over the course of the offering.  The premium 
decline is correlated with two types of explicit and easily visible payments to investment advisors, and 
to firms affiliated with investment advisors.  First, premium declines are more severe for offerings in 
which a larger proportion of the net proceeds are paid as investment advisory fees.  Second, premium 
declines are larger for funds that employ broker-dealers affiliated with the investment advisory firm, to 
solicit subscriptions to the rights offering.  The negative relations persist when we control for other 
factors that could influence premium changes, and are robust to econometric techniques that account 
for serial and cross-correlation in the data.  Our regressions suggest that the magnitudes of the above 
effects are comparable to average premium levels, and therefore economically meaningful.  For 
example, a fund that employs an affiliated broker-dealer to solicit subscriptions to rights suffers an 
incremental premium decline ranging from 1.7 to 5.7% of NAV.  Similarly, an increase in the 
investment advisory fee that is one standard deviation higher than average, results in an incremental 
premium decline of 1.4% of NAV. 
We also perform a clinical analysis of rights offerings and find that despite lawsuits and shareholder 
pressure, investment advisors are able to use rights offerings to sidestep negotiated fee reductions.  
Further, using simple cases, we show that investment advisors direct brokerage commissions to 
affiliated entities.  Both our large sample and clinical analyses understate the total benefits to investment 
advisors, because we focus only on pecuniary benefits even though non-pecuniary benefits can be 
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substantial.  Overall, our results suggest that agency problems play an important role in the operation 
and management of closed-end funds.  More importantly, we establish a link between changes in 
premiums and agency costs. 
In addition to contributing to the closed-end fund literature, our results are also relevant for the 
equity issuance literature.  Theories of equity issuance rely on information asymmetry about the value of 
assets-in-place or investment opportunities, leverage effects, price pressure, or managerial opportunism 
to explain the cross-sectional variation in abnormal announcement returns.2  Certain unique institutional 
features of closed-end funds allow us to abstract from, or explicitly control for, some of these issues.  
Since the assets held by closed-end funds are generally traded in liquid markets, there is little or no 
scope for information asymmetry about the value of the assets-in-place, to explain our results.  
Moreover, since closed-end funds invest the proceeds of the rights issue in relatively efficient capital 
markets (as opposed to industrial firms’ investment in less efficient product markets), there should also 
be less information asymmetry with regard to investment opportunities.  Even though some funds offer 
access to restricted markets or securities, various proxies for such investment opportunities are not 
significant in our regressions.  Since closed-end funds are not taxed at the corporate level, leverage 
effects also cannot explain our results.  Finally, variables designed to capture price pressure effects are 
not related to premium declines.  Our results do support the managerial opportunism hypothesis, and 
                                                 
2 See Myers and Majluf (1984), Cooney and Kalay (1993), Ambarish, John and Williams (1987) for information 
asymmetry explanations, and Scholes (1972), Shleifer (1986), and Harris and Gurel (1986) for price pressure arguments 
and Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) for agency-based explanations.  For evidence, see Asquith and Mullins (1986), 
Masulis and Korwar (1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Scholes (1972), Shleifer (1986), Harris and Gurel (1986), 
Barclay and Litzenberger (1988), and Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996). 
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concur with Jung, Kim and Stulz’s (1996) conclusion that agency relationships play an important role in 
the capital acquisition process. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  We discuss the data collection procedure and 
descriptive statistics in Section II, multivariate results in Section III and clinical evidence in Section IV.  
We conclude the paper in Section V. 
 
II.  Data 
A.  Data Collection 
We obtain a comprehensive list of rights offerings by closed-end funds for the 1988-1998 period 
from Lipper Analytical Services.  This list contains issuance information on 131 offerings over this 
eleven-year period.  This information includes offering dates, expiration dates, net proceeds, and a 
binary variable indicating whether the offering is transferable.  
We supplement this information with data from several other sources.  First, we obtain 
prospectuses for each offering from the fund, Lipper Analytical Services, or the SEC’s Edgar 
database.  From these prospectuses, we collect announcement dates, unrealized capital gains 
information and pricing features.  We also use prospectuses to confirm the accuracy of the data 
provided by Lipper, collect information on investment advisory fee structures, details of brokerage 
transactions, and whether the fund uses a broker-dealer to solicit subscriptions to rights during the 
offering period.  Second, we search for any mention of our sample funds in the Wall Street Journal 
Index (WSJI) and the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service (DJNR) over the eleven-year period to 
identify announcements that are relevant to the rights issues.  Third, we use proxy statements from the 
year prior to the offering to obtain information on insider and blockholder ownership.   
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To determine whether blockholders are friendly or hostile, we employ a two-stage process.  First, 
we match our sample with the appendix of Barclay, Holderness, and Pontiff (1993).  Their appendix 
contains a detailed description of each fund and a classification of funds with and without friendly 
blockholders.  Second, following Barclay, Holderness, and Pontiff (1993), we search all entries in the 
WSJI and DJNR for any mention of blockholder attempts to open end the fund.  Blockholders who 
attempt to open-end the fund are classified as non-friendly.  
We obtain weekly price and NAV data primarily from Lipper Analytical Services and from the 
Wall Street Journal.  In situations where we cannot obtain NAV and price data from either of these 
two sources, we obtain data from Bloomberg.  Our data requirements result in a sample of 120 
offerings by 73 different closed-end funds.  This sample represents almost the entire population of 
offerings over the sample period. 
 
B. Sample Selection Issues 
Section 23 of the Investment Company Act stipulates that closed-end funds cannot issue shares at 
a price below the NAV of the fund, except if: (i) the offering is made to existing stockholders (i.e. a 
rights issue); (ii) a majority of shareholders consent to the offering; (iii) the stock is issued upon 
conversion of a convertible security; (iv) the offering is due to the exercise of warrants outstanding on 
the date of enactment of the Investment Company Act of 1940; or (v) the SEC explicitly permits the 
fund to issue stock.  Technically, a fund can conduct a seasoned equity offering (SEO) if it is trading at 
a premium.3  If managers are in fact permitted to conduct both seasoned and rights offerings, then 
                                                 
3 This is a risky strategy since if the premium were to turn negative, the fund would be in violation of the law. 
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managers who expect the premium to fall will do rights offerings, and those who expect to maintain a 
positive premium will issue seasoned equity.  This raises the possibility of a sample selection bias that 
could influence our results. 
To determine the importance of this potential selection bias, we obtain a comprehensive list of 
SEOs by closed-end funds from two sources: Lipper Analytical Services and the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) database.  These data show that SEOs by closed-end funds are an extremely 
infrequent occurrence.  There are only 13 SEOs by 6 closed-end funds in our sample period.  No 
more than two offerings take place in any one year and all of the offerings are by country funds.  Ten 
(77%) of these 13 offerings are conducted by three funds (The Taiwan Fund conducted six, The ROC 
Taiwan Fund conducted two and the Korea Fund conducted two offerings).  The low frequency of 
SEOs is consistent with the view that Section 23 of the Act is effective in discouraging SEOs, 
suggesting that the selection bias is unimportant for our sample.  Nonetheless, we perform two 
additional checks to ensure the accuracy of this conclusion.  First, for the population of 13 SEOs, we 
compare premiums before and after the offerings.  We find that one week prior to the SEO, the 
average premium is almost 24% (compared to approximately 2% for rights offers).  This is an unusually 
high premium, which lowers the likelihood that the fund would trade at a discount and be in violation of 
the law by the time the shares are offered.  After the offering, the average premium declines to 13%.  
The fact that premiums also decline for SEOs is inconsistent with the idea that managers who expect to 
maintain a positive premium use SEOs.  Second, we discuss the selection bias issue with a senior 
official in the Closed-End Fund Division of Lipper Analytical Services, who confirms that Section 23 
of the Act is binding for most funds.  Given these data, we believe that sample selection bias does not 
influence our results. 
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C.  Price Adjustment to Reflect the Drop in Value on the Ex-Rights Date  
Rights offers involve the transfer of in-the-money warrants to shareholders, which are detached 
from the stock on the ex-date.  As a result, there is a price decline on the ex-date, similar in spirit to 
one that would occur for common stock on an ex-dividend date.  As with most price series (such as 
those supplied by CRSP), it is important to adjust the time series of prices and NAVs to reflect this ex-
date effect.  Lipper Analytical Services provides us with “rights adjustment factors” to make this 
correction.  These factors are equivalent to the adjustment factors that CRSP uses to adjust prices for 
rights offerings, and are applied in a similar manner (by multiplying the price series by the adjustment 
factor from the ex-date).  Conceptually, the adjustment factors “gross up” the time series so that 
changes in prices and NAVs before and after the offering are comparable.  For transferable offerings, 









1  where PR is the closing price of the right on the first trade date and PS 








1 where ∆NAV is the (dollar) change in NAV as a result of the rights offering, and takes 
into account over-subscription privileges and expenses associated with the offer, and NAVP is the 
NAV prior to dilution. 4  For non-transferable offerings, the NAVs and prices are adjusted using the 
same NAV-based factor because the rights are not publicly traded. 
                                                 
4 The CRSP adjustment factors, FACPR and FACSHR, adjust the price and shares outstanding series in a similar 
manner. 
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We test the robustness of the above adjustment factors by ensuring that the intrinsic value of the 
rights is always smaller than the value of the traded rights.  We also compare the Lipper adjustment 
procedure to the CRSP adjustment procedure (the two are quite similar) and ensure that warrant 
values calculated using the Noreen and Wolfson (1981) procedure are similar to Lipper adjustment 
factors.  These checks indicate that the Lipper adjustment factors are reasonable.  We then use these 





, where Pit (NAVit) is the price (net asset 
value) of fund i at time t. 
 
D. Sample Distribution 
We show the time-series distribution of the sample in Table 1.  Most of the sample is concentrated 
in the period from 1992 to 1996.  Of the 120 offerings, 74 are offerings by funds that conducted at 
least one prior offering up to three years before the start of the sample period.  We refer to these as 
repeat offerings.  We report the distribution of these repeat offerings in the right-hand column of panel 
A.  The majority of repeat offerings take place between 1992 and 1995.  We report the frequency of 
offerings classified by the number of prior offerings by the same fund in panel B.  The data show that 
repeat offerings are frequently the second and third offering by a fund.  One fund in our sample, Royce 
Value Trust, conducted six offerings over the sample period.  The clustering in calendar-time and 
across funds suggests a lack of independence in the data which could influence our results.   We return 
to this issue in Section III.C. 
 
E.  Descriptive Statistics 
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In Table 2, we present descriptive statistics for the sample.  Approximately 64% of the funds in our 
sample are equity funds while the remaining are bond or convertible securities funds.  Also, 49% of the 
sample consists of country funds.  The average market value of the funds on the day prior to the 
announcement of the rights offering is $318 million.  There is, however, considerable variation in fund 
size; the smallest fund in our sample has a market value of $25 million (The Bull and Bear Global 
Income Fund) while the largest fund’s market value is $1.9 billion (Nuveen Municipal Value Fund).  
Almost all fund categories, including a variety of bond (municipal, high yield, government and 
convertible) funds, equity funds, and country funds are represented in our sample. 
Table 2 also shows that on average, rights offerings raise $53 million.  Rights are always issued at a 
discount to the prevailing price, and are almost always fully subscribed.  Since the average market 
value of the fund is $318 million, these offerings clearly have a significant impact on the size of the fund.   
Only 35% of the offerings are transferable, which means that for 65% of the rights cannot be sold to 
another investor.   Approximately 60% of all offerings utilize broker-dealers to solicit subscriptions to 
the rights offer from individual shareholders.  Broker-dealers are provided with a list of shareholders by 
the fund for this purpose.5 
A majority of the funds trade at a premium prior to the offering.  The premium on the day of the 
announcement is 2% (mean and median).  A friendly blockholder is present in 10% of the sample and 
61% of the sample funds have antitakeover provisions. 
 
III.  Premium Changes and Compensation from Rights Offerings 
                                                 
5 The shareholder list is a partial list because investors who refuse broker-dealer mailings are excluded from the list. 
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A.  Premium Changes: Measurement Issues and Univariate Analysis 
We follow the existing literature on agency costs and closed-end funds (Barclay, Holderness, and 
Pontiff (1993), and Coles, Suay, and Woodbury (2000)) and on closed-end fund event studies 
(Bonser-Neal, Brauer, Neal, and Wheatley (1990), and Brickley and Schallheim (1985)) by focusing 
on premium changes rather than abnormal returns.  In addition to convention and comparability, we 
follow this approach because Gruber (1996) argues that premiums are a direct measure of managerial 
ability.  Consistent with this notion, Chay and Trczinka (1999) present evidence that premiums reflect 
the market’s assessment of future performance. 
Analysis of premium changes presents us with an empirical difficulty. Recall that we obtain 
announcement dates from offering prospectuses.  We confirm these dates from searches in the Dow 
Jones News Retrieval System but find that the initial announcement press release (reported on 
newswires) provides very little information about the offering characteristics.  Seven out of the first ten 
announcements that we examine do not provide any information on the use of proceeds, distribution 
arrangements, details of the offering price etc.  Instead, these data are revealed during the weeks 
following the announcement.  Moreover, in 80% of the offerings, the subscription price is a function of 
average NAVs and prices just prior to the subscription date.  Thus, for these offerings, the potential 
dilution for non-participating shareholders cannot be assessed until the subscription price has been 
determined.  As a result of the slow release of information, and the inability to cumulate or compound 
premiums, we are forced to employ event windows that are somewhat wider that those traditionally 
used. 
Our remedy to the above problem is to construct measures of premium changes by averaging 
premiums before and after the announcements.  Specifically, for each offering, we compute a premium 
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change by subtracting the average premium over weeks –5 to –1 (the pre-event period) from the 
average premium over weeks +1 to +5 (the post-event period).6  This allows us to include funds in the 
sample with intermittent premium data.  Moreover, serial correlation in premiums and premium changes 
is typically quite high and averaging dampens the correlation.  We choose a 5-week post-event 
window because it captures most of the information released about the offering.  Because the median 
interval from announcement to the start of the subscription period for our sample is 7 weeks, it is 
possible that this premium change misses important information between weeks +5 and the subscription 
date (for some offerings, the week +1 through +5 window may include the subscription period).  
Therefore, we also compute a second premium change in which the post-event window is week +1 to 
the subscription week. 7 
                                                 
6 We use level (rather than percentage) changes because percentage changes can be misleading.  For example, if a 
fund trades at a discount of 3% prior to the offering and trades at a premium of 3% after the offering, the percentage 
change is –200%, even though the premium increased. 
7 Since the interval from the announcement week to the subscription week varies across offerings, the number of 
observations used in calculating the post-event average differs across offerings. We note that the disadvantage of 
averaging in the post-announcement period (as opposed to using one particular week’s premium to compute the 
premium change) is a loss in power; this loss in power occurs because we mix premium data that reflect the impact of 
the offering with noise.  For example, suppose a fund’s premium declines from 3% on week –1, to -2% on week +3, 
because investor’s react negatively to the offering.  Since we average the 2% premium with the premium on weeks 
+1 and +2 (which need not be negative because of the slow release of information), our measure understates the 
premium decline.  However, given the advantages of averaging described above, this is a cost we bear because it 
biases us against finding a decline in premiums. 
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In panel A of Table 3, we present means and medians for both types of premium changes.  P-
values are in parentheses below the mean (median) and indicate whether the premium changes are 
significantly different from zero using a t-test (Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test).  When the post-event period 
is up to five weeks after the announcement, the median premium decline is one percentage point and is 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.00).  When the post-event period is from week +1 to the 
subscription week, the median premium decline increases to 1.7 percentage points (p-value = 0.05).  
Similarly, mean premium changes are also negative and statistically significant. 
Recall that the median premium level prior to the offering is approximately 2%.  The magnitude of 
the premium declines shown in Table 3 suggests that this premium is (approximately) reduced to zero.  
However, both of our premium change measures are differences of time-series averages in pre- and 
post-event periods.  If we compute cross-sectional averages in event time (i.e. the mean premium 
across all funds in weeks +1, +2 etc.), the premium decline is larger in magnitude.  In fact, the average 
premium one week before subscription week drops to –0.002%.  Overall, the results show a 
substantial decline in premiums over the course of the rights offerings. 
We also examine two simple univariate partitions to our sample in panel A based on the increase in 
the advisory fee and on the use of affiliated broker-dealers to solicit subscriptions to the rights.  First, 
we calculate the dollar value of the marginal increase in the investment advisory fee from each offering.  
Of the 120 offerings, 61 are for funds that employ a staggered advisory fee structure such that the 
percentage fee on additional assets declines as the dollar value of assets under management reach pre-
specified threshold levels (breakpoints in the compensation schedule).  In other words, the 
compensation schedule is a descending step function that specifies the “width” and “height” of each 
step.  For these offerings, we use the net proceeds from the offering and details of the fee structure 
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provided in the offering prospectuses to calculate the implied one-year increase in advisory fees.  In 57 
cases, the compensation schedule is a flat linear function of asset size.  For these cases, the marginal 
increase in advisory fee is simply the product of the percentage fee and the net proceeds from the 
offering.  In two cases (Adams Express and Baker, Fentress and Co.), the funds are managed 
internally and no compensation data are available. 
We scale the dollar value of the marginal fee increase by net proceeds, and divide our sample into 
offerings for which the (scaled) fee increases are above or below the median.   Higher fee increases 
may suggest that agency issues are more important at the fund and that the fund’s rights issues will be 
more beneficial for the advisor.  Using premium changes with the 5-week post-event window, we find 
that the median (mean) premium decline is 1.2 (1.3) percentage points for funds with higher fee 
increases, compared to 0.4 (0.3) percentage points for those with lower fee increases.  While these 
differences appear large, and are consistent with what one would expect in the presence of high agency 
costs for funds with high advisory fee increases, statistical tests fail to reject the null hypotheses that the 
means (medians) are equal.  When we measure premium changes in which the post-event interval is 
from week +1 to the subscription week, however, the differences in premium declines are larger and 
statistically significant (the p-value of differences in medians is 0.05 and the p-value of differences in 
means is 0.01). 
Second, we compare premium changes for offerings that use a broker-dealer affiliated with the 
investment advisor to solicit subscriptions to the rights, with those that do not.  If a broker-dealer has 
the same name as the investment advisor, or is a subsidiary of the investment advisor, we deem the 
broker-dealer to be “affiliated”.  Using the five week post-event interval, the mean (median) premium 
decline is 2.9 (3.3) percentage points for offerings that use an affiliated broker-dealer; for the 
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remainder of the sample, the premium decline is 0.1 percentage point and is not statistically different 
from zero.  The differences in premium changes across the two subsamples are significantly different 
(p-value = 0.00 for both means and medians).  Similar results are obtained when the post-event 
window is extended to the subscription week (p-values of tests of differences in both means and 
medians are 0.00). 
It is possible that the two univariate partitions described above vary systematically by type of fund.  
To investigate this potential clustering, we examine the distribution of these partitions across equity 
versus bond funds, country versus domestic funds and transferable versus non-transferable offerings.  
We find no systematic differences in distributions across these categories, for (i) the use of affiliated 
broker-dealers, and (ii) the increase in advisory fee above or below the median.  These distributions 
are not reported because a χ2 test does not reject the equality of distributions across these categories. 
In panel B, we present a more powerful univariate test of the relationship between premium 
changes and the scaled marginal increase in advisory fees, and affiliated broker dealers.  The panel 
shows Pearson correlation coefficients between these variables and both measures of premium changes 
and associated p-values.  The correlation between the scaled marginal increase in advisory fees and 
premium changes is –0.15.  The correlation between a dummy variable equal to one if the broker-
dealer is affiliated with the investment advisor (and zero otherwise), and the premium changes is even 
more negative (-0.26).  Both are statistically significant.  Thus, these simple univariate tests suggest that 
premium declines are more pronounced when compensation to investment advisors is high and when 
affiliated entities benefit from the offering.   
It is conceivable, however, that other offering characteristics generate premium declines.  To assess 
if the univariate premium changes are robust to other fund or offering characteristics, we estimate 
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cross-sectional regressions with the change in the premium as a dependent variable in the following 
section. 
 
B.  Multivariate Analysis  
To examine the premium changes cross-sectionally, we first need to identify the relevant 
independent variables.  Our choice of independent variables is motivated by our desire to detect the 
influence of conflicts of interest on rights offerings and accompanying premium changes.  As a result, 
our primary independent variables measure advisory fee increases and the presence of affiliated 
solicitation dealers.  We also include certain fund and offering characteristics to control for other effects 
that might influence premium changes.  
We use two variables to measure the effect of advisory fee increases.  The scaled marginal 
increase in advisory fee is defined as in the univariate analysis (Table 3) and reflects the proportion of 
the proceeds that are paid out as advisory fees.  If higher fees are related to higher agency costs and if 
higher agency costs are associated with larger premium declines, then we expect a negative coefficient 
on this variable.  However, it is also important to control for the change in the marginal compensation 
rate in the regression.  Coles, Suay, and Woodbury (2000) show that lower sensitivity of compensation 
to NAV lowers the premium.  Since contracts are often concave step-functions, and rights offerings 
always increase asset value, it is possible that premium declines are due to the change in the marginal 
compensation rate.  The appropriate way to measure this is to examine the change in the slope of the 
fee schedule due to the rights offering.  For 57 offerings, the compensation schedule is a flat function of 
asset size and therefore the change in the marginal compensation rate is zero.  Of the remaining 61 
offerings, 46 are at the bottom of their compensation schedule and 9 do not cross a threshold in the 
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compensation schedule.  As a result, the change in the marginal compensation rate is zero for 112 out 
of 118 offerings.  Due to the absence of variation in the change in the marginal compensation rate, we 
construct an alternative, albeit less precise, measure.  Specifically, we calculate the change in 
compensation expense ratio, defined as the advisory fee after the offering scaled by market value, 
minus the advisory fee before the offering scaled by market value, as an independent variable.   
We use three variables to assess the importance of affiliated broker-dealers used to solicit 
subscriptions to the rights.  The affiliated broker-dealer indicator variable is equal to one if the fund 
uses a broker-dealer that is affiliated with the advisor.   If the use of an affiliated dealer is another way 
for the investment advisor to increase payments to the advisor’s parent, then we expect a negative 
coefficient for this variable.  It is also possible that premium declines take place simply because using 
broker-dealers (whether affiliated or not) results in incremental expenses.  To determine if the 
incremental transaction cost of using (any) broker-dealer drives our results, we also include the broker-
dealer fee divided by net proceeds as an independent variable.  Finally, we include an interaction 
effect between the affiliated broker-dealer indicator variable and the broker-dealer fee scaled by net 
proceeds.  This variable is designed to capture the effect of the higher fees charged by affiliated 
dealers. 
Finally, we include three other independent variables as controls.  The friendly blockholder 
indicator is equal to one if the fund has a friendly blockholder and is included because Barclay, 
Holderness, and Pontiff (1993) document that funds with friendly blockholders trade at larger 
discounts.  The antitakeover provision dummy is equal to one if the fund has an antitakeover 
provision in place.  This variable is included because the presence of antitakeover provisions may 
indicate managerial entrenchment.  The number of prior offerings by the fund is included because 
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many funds conduct multiple rights offerings over the sample period, and it is possible that some (later) 
offerings are anticipated.8 
The results of the cross-sectional regressions appear in Table 4.  We present eight models, four 
sets for each dependent variable.  In models (i) through (iv) the dependent variable is the premium 
change in which the post-event window is week +1 through +5; in models (v) through (viii), the 
dependent variable is the premium change in which the post-event window is week +1 through the 
subscription week. 
Models (i) and (v) present our basic regressions with the explanatory variables described above.  
However, since the interaction effect between the affiliated broker-dealer dummy and the scaled dealer 
fee exhibits a high degree of collinearity with the affiliated broker-dealer dummy (ρ=0.89), we cannot 
estimate coefficients for the two variables in the same regression.  As a result, we also estimate models 
(ii) and (vi) in which we include the interaction effect but remove the affiliated broker-dealer dummy.  
Clustering in calendar time and fund-specific effects could influence the standard errors of the models 
described above.  Since some funds conduct only one offering over the sample period, typical panel-
data remedies that account for lack of independence (such as variance component or other GLS-based 
models) cannot be applied.  We employ two alternatives to account for dependence.  First, we 
estimate a “partial-fixed-effects” model by including indicator variables for each fund that conducts 
multiple rights offerings.  The results of these models are reported in models (iii) and (vii).  Second, we 
re-estimate the regressions using a portfolio approach; for funds conducting multiple offerings, we use 
                                                 
8 The literature on closed-end fund premiums suggests a number of other important control variables, such as 
unrealized capital gains, fund type, etc.  We do not report regressions with these (and other) control variables in 
Table 4 in the interest of brevity, but defer a discussion of the influence of these variables to Sections III.C and III.D. 
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the average premium change across all offerings as the dependent variable and similarly averaged 
independent variables.  The results of this estimation are reported in models (iv) and (viii). 
Of the control variables, the friendly blockholder dummy is insignificant in all models.  The 
antitakeover provision indicator is positive across all specifications but statistical significance is 
specification dependent.  In models (i) and (ii) it is significant at the 0.06 level and in model (vi) it is 
significant at the 0.07 level.  It is not statistically significant, however, in regressions that account for 
dependencies in the data (models (iii), (iv), (vii) and (viii)).  The number of prior offerings is not 
statistically significant in five out of six regressions  (it is not included in the portfolio regressions, models 
(iv) and (viii)). 
Next we turn to our primary variables of interest, relating to advisory fees and the use of an 
affiliated broker-dealer.  We find that scaled marginal increase in advisory fee is negatively related to 
premium changes in all model specifications.  In six out of eight specifications the p-values on the 
coefficients are equal to or less than 0.05, and in the remaining two models, the coefficients are 
significant at the 0.06 and 0.07 level.  In the “portfolio” models with the most conservative standard 
errors (models (iv) and (viii)), the p-values are 0.02 and 0.04 respectively.  The magnitude of the 
coefficients varies from  –2.407 to –3.575, and the average value of the coefficients across all 
specifications is –3.472.  To assess the economic significance of these parameter estimates we 
compute the effect of a one-standard deviation increase in the scaled marginal increase in advisory fees.  
Ceteris paribus, if the scaled marginal increase in advisory fee rises from its mean value (0.0087) to one 
standard deviation higher (0.0128), this results in an incremental premium decline of 1.4 percentage 
points (-3.472 times 0.0041).  Thus, these coefficients represent economically large declines in 
premiums. 
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Interestingly, the change in the compensation expense ratio is insignificant in all specifications.  Even 
though rights offerings necessarily raise asset value, the proportionate decline in percentage fees does 
not “cause” a decline in the premium.9  More importantly, the effect of the scaled marginal increase in 
advisory fee is robust to this somewhat mechanical link between compensation schedules and NAV. 
The affiliated broker-dealer dummy variable is negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
(or better) across all regression specifications.  The coefficients vary from –0.017 to –0.057.  The 
average across all coefficients is –0.040 indicating that, ceteris paribus, an offering employing an 
affiliated broker-dealer to solicit subscriptions suffers a premium decline that is 4 percentage points 
larger than an offering that does not.  The magnitude of this decline is also economically significant; it is 
sufficient to eliminate the average premium of 2% prior to the offering.  Thus, shareholders appear to 
penalize funds conducting offerings in which solicitation payments are directed to entities affiliated with 
fund management.  This effect is not simply due to higher transaction costs when the services of an 
affiliated dealer are used, since the scaled fee itself is insignificant in all models.  Moreover, the 
interaction effect between the affiliated dealer indicator variable and the fee is negative, implying that 
higher fees, when charged by affiliated dealers, are associated with larger premium declines. 
 
C. Specification Issues 
                                                 
9 We also estimate the regressions with the change in the marginal compensation rate (a change in the APPMGRT 
measure used by Coles, Suay and Woodbury (2000)) and find that coefficient on this variable is also insignificant.  
As discussed earlier, this is most likely due to the fact that the marginal compensation rate changes in only 6 
offerings.  Moreover, scaling the change in compensation expense ratio by NAV instead of market value also has no 
material influence on our results. 
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Our results thus far suggest a negative relation between premium changes and explicit payments to 
investment advisors.  This conclusion may, however, be sensitive to measurement problems and 
specification issues in both the dependent and independent variables.  We briefly discuss these 
measurement issues next. 
The regressions in Table 4 are parsimonious and, in some models, account for dependencies in the 
data.  However, averaging in the construction of the dependent variables may be problematic and 
could potentially alter our conclusions.  For instance, serial correlation in premium changes is typically 
quite high.  To assess the robustness of our results, we estimate a number of alternative models that 
explicitly account for serial correlation.  Specifically, we follow Bonser-Neal, Brauer, Neal, and 
Wheatley (1990) and stack two years of premium changes centered around the announcement week 
and estimate a regression using Hansen’s (1982) Generalized Method of Moments with weekly 
premium changes as the dependent variable and three indicator variables.  The indicator variables, D1t, 
D2t, and D3t, take on a value of 1 if t is between week –10 to –6, -5 to +5, and +6 to +10 
respectively. 10  The coefficient on D2t measures the change in premium over the announcement period; 
D2t, and D3t are included in the regression to allow for delayed reporting of NAVs and prices and for 
non-synchronous trading. 
                                                 
10 The instruments are the regressors in the above regression.  Therefore, while the coefficient estimates are the same 
as those obtained using OLS, the standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.  Pre-testing 
reveals that the autocorrelation coefficients for premium changes in our data are -0.43, -0.21, -0.14, -0.11, -0.06, -0.04, -
0.01, -0.00 for the first 8 lags; auto-correlations are insignificant after 8 lags.  Therefore, we employ a Newey-West 
correction of 8 lags.  We note that while the variance-covariance matrix used in this regression accounts for serial 
correlation, it does not account for cross-correlations due to multiple offerings by the same fund. 
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 The coefficient on D2t for the entire sample is –0.002 (t-statistic = -2.52) and the coefficient on D3t 
is –0.005 (t-statistic = -2.86).  Thus, premium declines are robust to serial correlation in the data and 
are consistent with the results in Table 3.  We also estimate similar regressions with an interaction effect 
between the scaled marginal increase in advisory fees and D2t and with an interaction effect between 
the affiliated solicitation dealer dummy and D2t.  In both cases, the interaction effects are negative; the 
t-statistic on the first interaction is -1.98 and the t-statistic on the second is -2.04.   
In addition to serial correlation, it could be that clustering in calendar time influences our results.  
We re-estimate all regressions reported in Table 4 with indicator variables for calendar years 1992, 
1993, 1994 and 1995 but our major results remain unchanged.  It is also unlikely that fund-specific 
factors explain our results since only two of the firm-specific dummy variables in the fixed effects 
models [(iii) and (vii)] are statistically significant.  In the portfolio regressions [models (iv) and (viii)], we 
also include the average number of rights offerings per year as an additional regressor to account for 
the possibility that some offerings may be anticipated.  The coefficient on this variable is not significant 
and our basic results remain unchanged.   
 
D. Confounding Issues 
It is possible that the premium declines are caused by factors entirely unrelated to agency problems 
in closed-end funds.  Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that the equity issuance decision signals over-
valuation of existing assets and therefore results in a price decline.  Unlike industrial firms, however, the 
assets of most closed-end funds are traded in liquid markets.  As a result, there is little (if any) 
information asymmetry about the value of assets-in-place.  It is, of course, possible that information 
asymmetry about investment opportunities drives our results.  For instance, it could be that premium 
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changes are related to unique investment opportunities provided by some funds; some country funds 
may provide access to otherwise restricted capital markets and/or investment securities.  To determine 
if this is the case, we estimate the regressions with two explanatory variables to capture this effect: a 
restricted-country fund dummy variable and the average premium prior to the offering (to approximate 
a measure of growth opportunities such as Tobin’s Q).  The former is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the fund invests in countries with restricted access to capital markets and zero otherwise.  The latter is 
computed as the average premium over a 26-week period prior to the announcement of the offering.  
These variables are not statistically significant.   
It is also possible that price pressure accounts for the premium declines.  Accordingly, we re-
estimate our regressions with an explanatory variable controlling for the size of the offering because 
large offerings are likely to put more pressure on the price of a security.  We do not find a relation 
between the size of the offering and premium changes.  Burch and Hanley (1996) and Miles and 
Peterson (1996) report an increase in short selling after announcements for transferable offerings, 
which, they argue, can cause price pressure and depress fund premiums.  We include a transferable 
offering indicator variable in the regressions but it also is not statistically significant.   
For a subsample of funds for which we could obtain data, we also include the unrealized capital 
gain per share scaled by the announcement day price.  If a fund has unrealized capital losses (gains), 
then the expected personal tax advantage (disadvantage) could cause a fund to trade at a premium 
(discount).  New assets added through a rights offering do not possess this tax advantage 
(disadvantage) and could cause the premium (discount) to fall [see Brickley, Manaster, and Schallheim 
(1991) for a description of this tax timing option].  This variable also does not have any explanatory 
power in our regressions.   
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Finally, some of our explanatory variables may simply proxy for fund type rather than agency costs 
associated with the rights offering.  For example, advisory fees (and therefore, advisory fee increases) 
vary systematically across types of funds.  However, our basic results remain unchanged when we add 
equity or country fund indicator variables to the regressions in Table 4. 
We do not report these specifications in additional tables but overall, alternative econometric 
specifications and additional control variables do not appear to materially influence our results.  The 
battery of robustness checks returns us to our original conclusion: the decline in premiums is 
systematically related to the pecuniary benefits derived by investment advisors from rights offerings.  In 
the next section, we explore the magnitude and form of these benefits. 
 
IV.  Direct and Indirect Benefits of Rights Offerings to Investment Advisors  
In this section, we start our analysis of the direct and indirect benefits of rights offerings to 
investment advisors by providing full sample evidence on the direct benefits of rights offerings to 
investment advisors.  We first document the magnitude of the projected advisory fee increases and fees 
to affiliated solicitation dealers.  In the course of reading offering prospectuses and public press 
reactions to fund offerings, we discovered a wide array of other benefits derived by investment 
managers.  Unfortunately, large sample study of these benefits is made difficult by the lack of systematic 
archival data.  In addition, the heterogeneity in techniques employed by funds to derive benefits is quite 
large; as a result, even if we could obtain systematic data, the number of parameters to be estimated 
from the cross-sectional regressions of the type described earlier would be prohibitively large.  Thus, 
we employ a clinical approach to study the diversity in pecuniary benefits. 
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A. Full Sample Evidence of Benefits 
We present statistics on financial benefits that investment advisors can derive from the offering in 
Table 5.  First we report the increases in investment advisory fees in panel A.  Prior to the offering, the 
average advisory fee is $2.2 million, with a median of $1.1 million.  As reported in Section III.A, there 
are 61 offerings in which the compensation contract has a staggered fee structure and 57 that have flat 
fee structures (and we do not have the data for 2 internally managed funds).  Since fees are always 
computed as a function of the asset base, regardless of the structure, rights offerings always result in an 
increase in the dollar value of the fees.  For the entire sample, the advisory fee is projected to increase 
by $396,000 on average (with a median increase of $264,000).  The average percentage increase in 
advisory fee over the previous year is almost 24%.   
This percentage increase is clearly economically meaningful.  But the cumulative effect of the fee 
increase is even larger.  If we (conservatively) assume no growth in asset size, and discount the average 
projected increases for each fund by its expected return, then the average of the present value of the 
fee increases is $3.5 million.11  In addition, the cumulative impact of multiple offerings is obviously 
larger than for one-time offerings.  For example, prior to its first offering, the total assets of Gabelli 
Equity Trust were approximately $500 million and the investment advisory fee was $3.3 million.  The 
fund conducted four offerings in 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1995 raising almost $350 million and 
increasing investment advisory fees by almost $3 million.  These results suggest that the pecuniary 
benefits to investment advisors from rights offerings can be quite large. 
                                                 
11 To calculate the expected return, we use the beta for the fund prior to the announcement of the offering (as 
reported by Bloomberg), the prevailing 10-year T-Bond yield and a market risk premium of 7%. 
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In panel B, we provide statistics on the use of and payments to affiliated broker-dealers.  About 
60% of all offerings involve broker-dealers used to solicit subscriptions and slightly less than half of 
these offerings (or 28% of all offerings) involve broker-dealers who are affiliated with the investment 
advisor.  This affiliation can take a variety of forms but frequently the affiliation is direct, such as when 
the brokerage arm of the investment advisor is employed as a solicitation dealer.  For example, the 
investment advisor of the Japan Equity Fund is Daiwa Securities Trust Co and in its 1994 offering, the 
fund employed Daiwa Securities as a dealer to solicit subscriptions to rights from shareholders.  
Unaffiliated broker-dealers are paid an average of $1.6 million per offering or 2.6% of net proceeds for 
their services.  Affiliated broker-dealers, on the other hand, are paid an average of $3.3 million per 
offering or 4.6% of proceeds.  A t-test of differences in means rejects equality across the two 
categories (p-value = 0.00), suggesting that affiliated broker-dealers earn significantly higher fees than 
non-affiliated broker-dealers.  While we do not know what proportion, if any, of the fees paid to 
affiliated solicitation dealers accrue to investment advisors, the benefits to the dealers themselves appear 
to be quite large. 
 
B. Clinical Evidence of Benefits 
We summarize our clinical findings into two sections.  The first section explores explicit fee 
arrangements and the second section describes transfer payments via the allocation of brokerage 
transactions. 
 
1. Data Collection 
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Clinical evidence is extracted from a variety of data sources.  Information on the resetting of fee 
structures is derived from offering prospectuses and proxy statements.  Details of shareholder lawsuits 
and public reactions to rights offerings are obtained by searching for any mention of a fund’s name on 
the Dow Jones News Retrieval database between 1988 and 1998.  Brokerage allocation data are 
obtained from fund-level N-SAR filings available on the SEC’s Edgar Database for the period closest 
to the rights offering. 
 
2. Explicit Fee Arrangements 
2.1. Shareholder Lawsuits 
Compensation arrangements coincident with rights offerings have been the subject of several 
shareholder lawsuits.12  In March 1996, an investor in the Brazil Fund filed a class action lawsuit 
against Scudder, Stevens & Clark, the investment advisor of the fund, following a rights offering.  The 
suit alleged that fund directors approved the offering, hurting existing shareholders but increasing 
management fees, and that several “independent” directors were so highly compensated that they 
should no longer retain their independent status.  While the investor eventually lost the lawsuit, a 
Maryland judge issued an interim ruling refusing to dismiss the investor’s claims and arguing that the 
ng relationship…is sufficient to call into question (director’s 
independence).”  The same shareholder also subsequently filed a lawsuit against the Brazilian Equity 
                                                 
12 The press has also viewed many rights offerings with skepticism, pointing to the coercive nature of rights offerings 
(because investors have to exercise/sell their rights or face dilution) and to the dramatic increases in investment 
advisory fees (see, for example, Power (1992, 1993), Gould (1993), Norton (1995)). 
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Fund and its investment advisor, BEA Associates, alleging “excessive” fees.13  The Brazilian Equity 
Fund raised $20 million in a rights offering.  This offering resulted in a projected one-time increase in 
investment advisory fees of $193,000 (an increase of 20% over the prior year).  Assuming no further 
growth in assets and capitalizing this value at the expected rate of return for the stock, the present value 
of this fee increase is $1.5 million.  The decline in value of the fund from one week prior to one week 
after the announcement was $4.6 million (the discount widened from 7.2% to 12%).  Thus the ratio of 
the fee increase to the decline in value is 33%, suggesting that the magnitude of the fee increase in 
contention is at least of the “right” order of magnitude to explain the premium decline. 
Perhaps the most well publicized lawsuits associated with rights offerings concern offerings by John 
Nuveen and Co.  In November 1993, Nuveen Premium Income and Nuveen Municipal Value 
announced offerings that subsequently raised $154 million and $259 million respectively.  Even before 
the offerings were completed, several investors filed class-action lawsuits seeking to block Nuveen 
Premium Income’s offering alleging that the offering would dilute the holdings of non-participating 
shareholders.  In June 1994, the court dismissed the suit arguing that investors can protect themselves 
from dilution by buying the maximum available number of additional shares and selling an equal number 
of older shares to raise the necessary cash.  This, of course, ignores the effects of transactions cost, 
                                                 
13 A secondary case against BEA Associates questioned the unaffiliated status of five “independent” directors 
because they served on multiple boards of funds managed by BEA.  BEA is the investment advisor for 11 closed-end 
funds, of which six conducted rights offerings.  Together, these offerings increased BEA’s fees by approximately $2.2 
million.  As a percentage of the prior year’s advisory fee, some of these fee increases are well above the average fee 
increase for the entire sample. 
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which could be offset by the offering discount.  In dismissing the case, however, the court stated that 
the claims would be more appropriate as a derivative action and the suit was filed again. 
Meanwhile, the law firm representing Nuveen in the suit “discovered” that the charter of both funds 
prohibited the sale of shares below NAV.  Therefore, both offerings clearly violated the charter.  
Nuveen calculated that difference between the offering price and NAV amounted to a combined total 
of $46.3 million.  The lawsuit was eventually settled for $24 million and while Nuveen apparently 
blamed its lawyers for the mistake, some commentators argued that the blame should rest with 
management and that the offering was motivated by the desire to increase advisory fees (see Savitz 
(1994)).  According to the prospectuses, the offerings would result in a fee increase of $1.64 million 
and $1.67 million for Nuveen Premium Income and Nuveen Municipal Value respectively.  The present 
value of these increases (capitalized at their respective expected rates of return and assuming no further 
growth), are $20.5 and $20.9 million respectively, and also represent substantial portions of the decline 
in market value of the funds during the announcement of offering ($72 million and $124 million 
respectively). (For Nuveen Premium Income the premium declined from 8.5% to 0.6% and for 
Nuveen Municipal Value the premium declined from 5.0% to –1.8%.) 
An important caveat is in order with respect to the lawsuits described above.  Allegations of 
excessive fees do not imply that the fee increases are necessarily excessive.  Indeed, it is only the 
connection between fee increases and the negative coefficients on the scaled fee increase in regressions 
in Table 4 that may (cautiously) permit such an interpretation. 
 
2.2. Ineffectiveness of Fee Rebates 
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Even if lawsuits or shareholder pressure are successful in ‘reducing’ fees, rights offerings can 
provide an indirect way to dissipate (if not remove entirely) the effects of the negotiated fee reduction.  
For example, in April 1988, the Three Bridges Investment Group filed a class action lawsuit against the 
management of the Liberty All-Star Equity Fund, alleging excessive advisory fees.  Soon thereafter, in 
November 1988, the Vanguard Group submitted a proposal to the management of the fund seeking to 
replace Liberty Asset Management as the investment advisor. This change was expected to lower the 
fund’s expenses by approximately $2 million a year.  The proposal was rejected but was followed by 
another shareholder lawsuit filed seeking unspecified damages for excessive fees and for refusing to 
adequately consider Vanguard’s proposal. 
In March 1991, Liberty Asset Management agreed to provide monthly rebates on a portion of its 
fees, to avoid “additional costs arising from the litigation”.  Based on the fund’s then asset base of 
$554 million, this rebate would reduce annual expenses by approximately $142,000, only 7% of the 
fee reduction proposed by Vanguard.  Interestingly, the reduction in dollar fees resulting from a 
resetting of the fee structure was more than offset by the increase in fees which resulted from three 
successive rights offerings in 1992, 1993, and 1994. The one-year projected increases in total fees 
from the three offerings were $542,000, $597,000 and $315,000.  These annual increases correspond 
to present values of $6.0 million, $6.6 million and $3.5 million (using the expected rate of return on the 
stock and assuming no growth in assets).  The value of these fee increases represent 28%, 48% and 
41% respectively of the decline in market value of the fund in each offering. 
The case of a 1994 rights offering by Pilgrim Prime Rate Trust provides another example of a 
situation where a fee rebate was more than offset by an increase in the asset base.  Prior to the offering, 
the investment advisor was paid 0.85% of net assets up to $700 million and 0.75% of assets thereafter 
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(net assets at the time were $724 million generating advisory fees of $6.1 million).  The rights offering 
raised $155 million, increasing assets to $879 million.  In its prospectuses, the fund recognized that the 
offering would increase advisory fees and voluntarily agreed to (ostensibly) lower fees on the second 
part of the staggered fee function (from 0.75% to 0.65% of net assets).  However, the change in the 
structure of the contract was more complex.  In fact, the new structure called for fees to be 0.85% of 
assets up to $800 million (up from the prior $700 million breakpoint) and 0.65% thereafter.  As a 
result, advisory fees after the offering increased by almost $1.1 million. 
In sum, external attempts (whether through lawsuits or shareholder pressure) to reduce fees appear 
to have had limited success.  Rights offerings provide a way for investment advisors to sidestep 
negotiated fee reductions and the present value of the fee increases correspond to a sizeable proportion 
of the value lost in the offerings. 
 
3. Brokerage Allocations 
Since rights offerings increase the asset base of the fund, commission income is generated by the 
investment of these assets.  The investment advisor has almost exclusive control over the trading 
activities of the fund, and it can use this control to direct commission income to itself or affiliated 
entities.  To examine these “directed” commissions, we gather data from filings by investment advisory 
firms with the SEC.  The SEC requires all investment companies to file an N-SAR statement on a 
semi-annual basis, listing the names of up to five affiliated broker-dealers.  The filing contains the names 
and commissions paid to the top ten broker-dealers used by the fund (in terms of transaction values).  
Thus, if an affiliated dealer is also one of the ten largest dealers (for the fund), we can determine the 
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amount of commissions paid to that dealer.  The filing also contains total commissions paid by the fund 
and annual portfolio turnover. 
Of the 73 unique funds (120 offerings) in our sample, we find N-SARs for 57 funds (93 offerings).  
Out of these 57 funds, over 61% (35 funds) employ at least one affiliated broker-dealer.  When we are 
able to match affiliated broker-dealer names with the top ten list of brokers, we calculate the 
percentage of total commissions paid to affiliated broker-dealers.  We are able to do this for 20 
funds.14 
Table 6 provides a list of these funds along with the percentage of commissions directed to 
affiliated broker-dealers.  The table shows that the magnitude of commission payments to affiliated 
broker-dealers can sometimes be quite large; across the 20 funds for which we have data, on average, 
21% of the commission payments are paid to affiliated broker-dealers.  Consider, for example, Gabelli 
Equity Trust.  The 1996 N-SAR statement reports that the fund employed three affiliated broker 
dealers: Gabelli and Company Inc. (a directly owned institutional brokerage firm), Keeley Investment 
Corporation, and IFG Network Securities Inc.  Of these three dealers, one (Gabelli and Company Inc) 
is in the list of top ten broker-dealers for the fund.  In fact, Gabelli and Company Inc is the largest 
broker-dealer for the fund, earning $85,000 in commissions in a six-month period in which the fund 
paid a total of $361,000 in commissions (corresponding to 23.5% of total commissions).   
Simple back-of-the envelope calculations show the likely impact of rights offerings on commission 
income to affiliated broker-dealers.  If we assume that the incremental assets raised by Gabelli Equity 
                                                 
14 For this particular analysis we shift our unit of analysis to funds rather than to offerings.  This is because N-SAR 
filings on Edgar are a relatively recent phenomenon and as a result, we are often only able to obtain one filing for 
funds with multiple offerings. 
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Trust in each of its rights offerings were fully invested, that Gabelli and Company continued to receive 
23.5% of commission income in the investment of these assets, and that the ratio of commissions to 
assets remains constant, then the implied one-time increase in commissions to Gabelli and Company 
from four rights offerings is approximately $60,000 for six months or about $120,000 annually (Gabelli 
has a portfolio turnover rate of approximately 50%). 
 
V.  Conclusion 
We examine the pecuniary benefits derived by investment advisors from rights offerings conducted 
by closed-end funds.  For a sample of 120 offerings by 73 funds, we show that, on average, funds 
trade at a premium prior to the offering.  This premium changes to a discount over the course of the 
offering.  The change in premium is negatively related to fees paid to investment advisors and to the use 
of affiliated broker-dealers to solicit subscriptions to rights.  These relations are not only statistically 
significant, but also economically quite important.   For example, if the marginal increase in advisory 
fees increases from its mean value to one standard deviation higher than its mean value, then the 
premium declines by 1.4 percentage points.  This is an important effect given that the average pre-offer 
premium is about 2%. 
Our paper contributes to two literatures.  First, our results indicate that agency costs play an 
important role in the management of closed-end funds.  Indeed, managerial discretion appears to be 
related to premium changes, in addition to the effects of managerial discretion on premium levels 
documented by other authors.  Second, our results suggest that agency costs are relevant for the capital 
acquisition process.  To the extent that our focus on closed-end funds allows us to abstract from 
industrial-firm-specific effects (such as information asymmetry about the value of assets in place or 
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Distribution and sequencing of rights offerings 
 
      
Panel A: Time-series distribution of rights offerings 
      
 All Offerings  Repeat Offerings 
Announcement Year Number of 
offerings 
Frequency  Number of 
offerings 
Frequency 
      
1988 1  0.8%  0  0.0% 
1989 1  0.8%  1  0.8% 
1990 1  0.8%  1  0.8% 
1991 4  3.3%  3  2.5% 
1992 18 15.0%  14 11.7% 
1993 41 34.2%  20 16.7% 
1994 19 15.8%  10  8.3% 
1995 17 14.2%  15 12.5% 
1996 10  8.3%  6  5.0% 
1997 3  2.5%  3  2.5% 
1998 5  4.2%  2  1.7% 
      
Panel B: Prior offerings 
      
Number of prior 
offerings 
Number of offerings  Frequency 
      
0 46  38.3% 
1 27  22.5% 
2 27  22.5% 
3 11   9.2% 
4 6   5.0% 
5 2   1.7% 
6 1   0.8% 
 
This table reports the number and frequency of rights offerings by closed-end funds from 
1988 to 1998.  Repeat offerings are offerings by funds that have done at least one other 
prior offering.  The number and frequency of offerings, classified by the number of prior 





Fund and Offering Characteristics 
 
     
 Min Mean Median Max 
     
Equity funds 
 
- 64.2% - - 
Country funds 
 
- 49.1% - - 
Market value ($ million) 
 
24.7 317.7 152.9 1,892.5 
Net proceeds of offering ($ million) 
 
4.4 52.7 33.9 299.2 
Transferable offerings 
 
- 35.0% - - 
Offerings with solicitation broker-dealers 
 
 60.0%   
Premium on announcement day 
 
-0.30 0.021 0.020 0.399 
Funds with a friendly blockholder 
 
- 10.0% - - 
Funds with antitakeover provisions 
 
- 61.0% - - 
This table provides details of fund and offering characteristics for 120 rights offering over 1988-
1998.  Market value is calculated by multiplying the number of shares outstanding by the closing 
price on the announcement date of the rights offering.  Net proceeds represent the total dollar value 
raised from the offering including oversubscription privileges but not including fees and expenses. 
Transferable offerings include those in which the rights can be sold to another party.  The premium 
on the announcement day is the closing price of the fund minus the net asset value, divided by the 
net asset value.   A friendly blockholder is a blockholder that is not identified as hostile in Barclay, 





Univariate Tests on Premium Changes 
 
 
Panel A: Sample partitions 
 Premium change 
[(–5,-1) to (+1,+5 )] 
 Premium change 
[(–5,-1) to (+1,subscription)] 
      
 Mean Median  Mean Median 











      
Offerings with scaled marginal increase in 









      
Offerings with scaled marginal increase in 









      
p-value for difference 0.14 0.13  0.01 0.05 
      










      










      
p-value for difference 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
      
Panel B: Pearson correlation coefficients 
 Premium change 
[(–5,-1) to (+1,+5 )] 
 Premium change 
[(–5,-1) to (+1,subscription)] 




      






This table presents univariate tests of two types of premium changes surrounding the announcement of rights offerings.  
First, premium changes are calculated by subtracting the average premium over weeks –5 to –1 from the average 
premium over weeks +1 to +5 [(–5,-1) to (+1,+5 )].  Second, premium changes are calculated by subtracting the 
average premium over weeks –5 to –1 from the average premium over week +1 through the subscription week [(–5,-1) 
to (+1,subscription)].  Panel A presents results for the full sample, and partitions based on the distribution of advisory fee 
increases scaled by net proceeds, and whether the offering employed an affiliated solicitation dealer.  P-values, in 
parentheses below the mean (median), indicate whether the premium changes are significantly different from zero using a 
t-test (Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test).  P-values for differences within subsample means (medians) are from standard t-tests 





Cross-sectional Analysis of Premium Changes 
 
    
 Premium change 
[(–5,-1) to (+1,+5 )] 
 Premium change 
[(–5,-1) to (+1,subscription)] 






















































































































































- -  - -1.110 
(0.00) 
- - 
















Fixed effects for multiple offerings 
 
- - Yes -  - - Yes - 
Averages for multiple offerings 
 
- - - Yes  - - - Yes 
N 118 118 118 71  118 118 118 71 
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.10 0.24 0.14  0.07 0.07 0.18 0.10 
 42
This table reports cross-sectional regression results with two measures of premium changes as the dependent 
variables.  The friendly blockholder indicator takes on a value of one if the fund has a friendly blockholder at the time 
of the offering, zero otherwise.  The antitakeover provision indicator takes on a value of one if the fund has an 
antitakeover provision in place, zero otherwise.  The scaled marginal increase in advisory fee is calculated by dividing 
the projected increase in advisory fees by net proceeds.  The change in the compensation expense ratio is calculated 
by subtracting the advisory fee (scaled by market value) in the year prior to the offering (t-1) from the year after the 
offering (t).  The affiliated broker-dealer indicator takes on a value of one if the fund uses a broker-dealer to solicit 
subscriptions that is affiliated with the fund or its investment advisor.  The broker-dealer fee is the dollar amount paid 
to the dealer, scaled by the net proceeds of the offering.  The dealer interaction term is the product of affiliated 
broker-dealer dummy variable and the dealer fee variable.  Models (iii) and (vii) employ indicator variables for each 
fund conducting multiple offerings during the sample period (fixed effects).  Models (iv) and (viii) employ a portfolio 
procedure in which, the average value of the independent and dependent variables are used for funds conducting 






Pecuniary benefits to investment advisors and affiliated entities from rights offerings 
 
     
 Min Mean Median Max 
     
Panel A: Investment advisory fees 
     
Advisory fee prior to offering ($ million) 
 
0.150 2.198 1.144 10.822 
Projected increase in advisory fee ($ million) 
 
0.037 0.396 0.264 1.670 
Increase in advisory fee scaled by offering size 
 
0.001 0.008 0.008 0.020 
Percentage increase in advisory fee 
 
4.5 23.8 21.9 95.4 
 
Panel B: Fees to solicitation-dealers 
     
Offerings with unaffiliated solicitation dealers 
 
- 32.5% - - 
Offerings with affiliated solicitation-dealers 
 
- 27.5% - - 
Solicitation fee for unaffiliated dealers ($ million) 
 
0 1.60 0.88 17.2 
Solicitation fee for unaffiliated dealers / net proceeds 
 
0 0.026 0.034 0.114 
Solicitation fee for affiliated dealers ($ million) 
 
0.51 3.34 1.69 17.2 
Solicitation fee for affiliated dealers / net proceeds 
 
0.023 0.046 0.039 0.114 
This table reports statistics on the distribution and amount of investment advisory fees and 
solicitation-dealer fees paid for 120 rights offerings over 1988-1998.  Panel A provides data on 
fees payable to investment advisors before and after the rights offerings.  Increases in advisory fees 
are computed using details of fee structures provided in offering prospectuses.  Panel B provides 
details on the use and compensation of solicitation-dealers employed to sell rights to investors.  All 





Brokerage and commission allocation 
 
   
Fund Name Total Commissions 
($ 000’s) 
Commissions to affiliated 
brokers (%) 
    
Adams Express 761 - 
Austria Fund 64 7.8 
Baker Fentress & Co 646 14.7 
Bergstrom Capital 100 - 
Blue Chip Value Fund 123 - 
China Fund 382 7.6 
Duff & Phelps Utilities Income 5,876 2.5 
European Warrant Fund 274 20.8 
First Australia Fund 586 0.5 
France Growth Fund 361 10.5 
Gabelli Equity Trust 361 23.5 
Italy Fund 59 3.4 
Japan Equity Fund 315 77.1 
Korean Investment Fund 368 14.4 
Latin American Discovery Fund 445 7.9 
Latin American Equity Fund 715 11.2 
Latin American Investment Fund 457 16.8 
Mexico Equity & Income Fund 367 100 
Mexico Fund 261 17.2 
New Germany Fund 855 51.2 
Pilgrim Prime Rate Trust 7 - 
Pilgrim Regional Bancshares 49 - 
Royce OTC Micro-Cap Fund 122 - 
Royce Value 364 - 
Singapore Fund 1452 6.7 
Source Capital 318 - 
TCW Convertible Securities 528 - 
Zweig Fund 1170 17.1 
Zweig Total Return Fund 526 9.7 
   
Average - 21.0 
 
The table lists the total dollar amount of commissions paid by each fund in a six month period for 
which data are available after a rights offering.  Also shown is the percentage of these commissions 
paid to affiliated broker-dealers and to soft dollar brokers. 
 
